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1 Introduction
Governments around the world have for some time
been exposed to the forces of globalisation and
macroeconomic reform. Within India, efforts to
regulate the impact of world and domestic markets
on vulnerable populations have shifted from
macroeconomic policies aimed at protecting core
industries, such as manufacturing, textiles and
agriculture, to microeconomic interventions aimed at
providing food and cash transfers to groups and
individuals affected by market fluctuations and
ecological disturbances, such as flooding and
drought.1 Central to this transformation has been a
process of decentralisation, in which responsibility for
the implementation of centrally funded employment
and self-employment programmes has been
delegated to lower level units of governance,
especially ones at the state and sub-state level.
The decentralisation of social policy in India reflects
an effort on the part of governments at state and
national levels to ease the impact of neoliberal
restructuring (see below) and to manage a series of
fiscal transformations, which have been ongoing
since the early 1990s. Within India, the liberalisation
of trade and investment has expanded the revenues
central governments collect through duties, licence
fees and tariffs on international commerce (even
when the actual levels are being reduced), and has
generated large surpluses for the central government
(Watts 2005; Garman et al. 2001; Rao and Singh
2005; Sinha 2005; Saxena and Farrington 2003;
Nayak et al. 2002). At the same time, growing and
ageing populations have increased the demands on
‘concurrent’ (or shared) policy areas, such as health
and education, producing a situation where the
jurisdictions, which are constitutionally required to
invest in the long-term economic viability of their
populations (i.e. the states), have become less able to
do so without central assistance (Rao and Singh
2005; Saxena and Farrington 2003).
Fiscal pressures to reduce spending on the part of
state governments have also led to the removal of
long-standing agricultural subsidies on electricity,
fertilisers and seeds, creating new vulnerabilities for
families and regions that have traditionally relied on
agricultural incomes (Christian Aid 2005;
Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2004; Vidyasagar and
Chandra 2004; Ahluwalia 2002). Coupled with the
liberalisation of domestic credit markets, rising costs
and spiralling debt have been blamed for a recent
wave of farmer suicides in the Indian states of
Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh (Christian Aid 2005;
Vidyasagar and Chandra 2004). Other interpretations
suggest that although liberalisation may be partially
to blame for the fiscal pressures that led to the
removal of state subsidies, deregulation of the
economy has also provided new and substantial
access to export markets, especially in manufacturing
and services (Ahluwalia 2002). Here it has been
argued that the liberalisation of India’s economy has
also led to improvements in overall rates of gross
domestic product (GDP) growth (an average of 6 per
cent per year in the 1990s) and reductions in poverty
(Ahluwalia 2002; Datt and Ravallion 2002).
Public debates about the liberalisation of India’s
economy are complicated by the fact that
representative institutions at national, state and sub-
state levels are elected, and that an estimated 60 per
cent of the population is dependent upon
agriculture, where growth rates have been less
spectacular (Chhibber and Eldersveld 2000;
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Ahluwalia 2002). The campaigns that preceded the
latest round of general (national) elections in 2004
were largely concerned with the incumbent BJP
(Bharatiya Janata Party) government’s record of rural
employment and economic growth. Although none
of the major parties seriously questioned the
liberalisation agenda, the campaigns did focus very
heavily on the kinds of policies a new government
would put in place to ease the transition to a more
liberalised economy. Along similar lines, incumbent
governments were voted out of power in Madhya
Pradesh (2003) and Andhra Pradesh (2004), primarily
as a result of a voter backlash against the
macroeconomic reform agenda being pursued by
government in the two states. Within the current
context, the pressure to compensate voters (and
potential voters) through the use of development
programmes has become very strong.
The decentralisation of ‘development compensation’
in India also reflects an effort on the part of
politicians, academics and a wide range of social
activists to put into practice Gandhi’s vision of rural
self-governance, or panchayati raj. In 1993, the
Government of India passed a series of constitutional
reforms (the 73rd and 74th Amendments, governing
rural and urban areas, respectively), aimed at
improving the performance and accountability of
local government bodies in India. At the village level
(which is the primary focus of this article) the gram
sabha, which constitutes all eligible voters within a
gram panchayat area, and the gram panchayat (the
elected village council), enjoy constitutional status
(meaning they cannot be abolished by the state
governments), and are now used as an important
means by which the central government delivers
rural development programmes in India. However,
studies of decentralisation in India have consistently
highlighted the fact that the ability of the panchayats
to undertake this function has been undermined by
the centralising tendencies of the state governments
(Mukarji 1999), the incentive structure of the non-
elected bureaucracy (Jha 2000; de Souza 2000) and
rural inequalities rooted in land holdings, caste,
religion and gender (de Souza 2000; Ghatak and
Ghatak 2002; Lieten and Srivastava 1999; Crook and
Manor 1998; Mukarji 1999).
Recognising these constraints, and recognising the
fact that the decentralisation of social policy varies
significantly among Indian states, a central aim of our
research was to understand the impact that local
governance structures have on the ability of
governments to implement social policies in rural
areas. Our principal points of entry were
employment and self-employment programmes,
including food for work (FFW), the Employment
Assurance Scheme (EAS) and, the focus of this
article, microcredit. Drawing upon 12 months of
primary field research, we compared the
administration of self-employment programmes in
Madhya Pradesh (MP) and in Andhra Pradesh (AP),
two states in which administrative and territorial
powers of local governance vary substantially. A
starting assumption in our research was that the
globalisation of trade and investment in India has
created new forms of vulnerability, and that the
ability of government to respond to these changes
will vary with the formal governance structures that
coexist within India’s federal system.
Our central findings are twofold. First, the economic
impact of government-sponsored self-help
programmes was minimal; despite the rhetoric, self-
help group (SHG) financing accounted for only a
minimal amount of rural debt financing in our study
villages. Second, and in some ways contradicting this
first finding, the perceived impact (and therefore the
political value) of SHG programmes was particularly
favourable in AP; among current and prior
beneficiaries of SHG programmes, self-help financing
was believed to have had a positive impact on rural
livelihoods and, in contrast to our findings in MP,
were perceived as being relatively free of corruption.
Our interpretation of these findings is that differences
in performance and perceptions of performance
reflect both the political importance that state
bureaucrats attach to self-help programmes in AP
and the size of the population being served by the
state bureaucracy. In particular, we argue that the
combination of development populism and more local
administration created a situation in which
beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries were much
more knowledgeable about the functioning and
impact of self-help financing in AP.
2 Research context and methodology
This article draws upon research conducted in 12
villages in six districts of AP and MP. A central
assumption that informed our selection of regions
and villages was that the political structures created
by the decentralisation processes in MP and AP were
sufficiently different to generate interesting
comparisons of the ways in which formal processes of
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decentralisation can affect accountability and
participation at the village level.2 First, the
government of MP conferred far greater
responsibilities to the locally elected bodies, especially
at village level. In contrast, the government of AP has
worked extensively through the state bureaucracy of
the line departments, effectively bypassing the locally
elected institutions. A second and crucial difference
between the two states concerns the size of the
population being served by the ‘intermediate’ level
institutions, which sit between the village and the
district, and implement the vast majority of
government programmes in India. In AP, the
intermediate level of administration is the mandal,
which serves an average of 10–25 villages. In MP, the
comparable point of reference is the block, which
serves a much larger population and a larger number
of villages. Blocks were originally demarcated to
contain a population of around 0.1 million, though
many now contain much larger populations, whereas
mandals, created by the Telegu Desam Party in AP for
efficient delivery of services to rural people, are
typically around one-third the size of a block.
A researcher worked in each of the villages for over
a year between June 2001 and June 2002. A large
sample of 40–70 households (680 in the two states)
was selected randomly, stratified by land holdings
and caste. Focus group discussions and key informant
interviews were designed to understand the extent
to which the panchayats and village assemblies were
able to affect the implementation of two general
types of government scheme: employment
generation and self-employment programmes. Focus
group discussions were conducted with major caste,
class, religious and age groups, as well as in separate
groups of men and women. The principal questions
were designed to understand:
z How the selection process works (informally),
with respect to principal social groups in the
villages (e.g. caste, class, gender, religion, age)
z How people perceive the role and quality of the
panchayats in general and with respect to their
particular group
z Levels of awareness about the nature of the
schemes being discussed, how the programmes
and panchayats are supposed to function and
what rights they are entitled to under these
programmes and in relation to the panchayats
z Whether and to what extent they have used
formal mechanisms (such as the gram sabha in
both states, the right to recall in MP) to ensure
accountability of government officials
z Which formal and informal mechanisms have
been most effective (if any).
Key informant interviews were conducted with
elected representatives (sarpanch, upa-sarpanch, all
ward members), non-elected officials, and villagers,
selected on the basis of caste, class and gender.
Alongside the household surveys, which involved
680 households, a total of 91 individuals (38 villagers,
21 officials and 32 panchayat representatives) were
interviewed in this stage of the research. Questions
were principally designed to find an understanding of:
z The political, administrative and fiscal powers that
the panchayats and gram sabha have to ensure the
appropriate and accountable delivery of
employment and self-employment schemes
z How the selection process takes place, especially
among panchayat members (representing
different wards and therefore different caste
constituencies) and the non-elected bureaucracy
z The extent to which the PRIs (Panchayati Raj
Institutions) have the power to ensure that
programmes are implemented according to the
letter of the norms, rules and laws under which
they were meant to be governed.
Until the change of government in 2003, MP was
portrayed as a pioneer in the field of decentralisation
(Behar and Kumar 2002; Manor 2001). In 1999, an
important reform, the ‘Right to Recall’, gave the
gram sabha (the village assembly) the power to
dismiss the panchayat chairman (the sarpanch) in the
event of wrong-doing. Between 1994 and 2003, the
government of MP passed a series of institutional
reforms, designed to enhance the power of the
gram sabha and the accountability of the gram
panchayat (the village council). This process
culminated in 2001, with the legislation of gram
swaraj or ‘village self-rule’ (Manor 2001; Johnson et
al. 2005).
In contrast to MP’s ambitious ‘experiment’ in direct
democracy, the AP government has been associated
with a system of governance that undermined the
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panchayats in favour of line departments and ‘parallel
bodies’, such as water user groups, joint forest
management committees and SHGs (Manor 2002;
Mathew 2001b). A principal vehicle in this process
was the AP government’s well-publicised
janmabhoomi programme. Introduced in 1997,
janmabhoomi aimed to reduce poverty through the
establishment of community development
programmes, such as watershed rehabilitation, joint
forest management, thrift and credit (Manor 2002;
Mooij 2002; World Bank 2000). Central to the
programme was the idea that poverty reduction is
contingent upon the active participation of poor
people, both in terms of self-employment through
subsidised credit but also in terms of contributions in
kind, such as voluntary labour (World Bank 2000).
The assumption here is that poor people require
both the resources and the incentive to lead healthy
and productive lives.
Whether or not it was able to achieve these aims,
janmabhoomi is believed to have undermined the
autonomy and functioning of the panchayats in two
important ways. First, it has been alleged that the
AP government diverted public resources intended
for centrally sponsored schemes into the
janmabhoomi programme, thereby ‘starving’ the
panchayats of funds which were rightfully theirs
(Manor 2002; Reddy 2002: 877). Second,
janmabhoomi is perceived to have used the gram
sabhas as a means of organising and identifying
beneficiaries, undermining the autonomy of the local
democratic bodies (World Bank 2000: 50; Reddy
2002).
Alongside janmabhoomi, one of the government’s
most important programmes was the DWCRA (the
Development of Women and Children in Rural
Areas). Manor (2006: 25) cites government
estimates, which suggest the existence of as many
as 475,646 DWCRA SHGs in AP, many of which
were established after 1997. Merged with the
centrally sponsored SGSY (Swarnjayanti Gramin
Swarozgar Yojna) programme in most other states
(including MP), DWCRA in AP is a low-interest
microcredit programme aimed at encouraging
collective savings and microenterprise investment
among poor women in rural areas (Mooij 2002:
33–45). The programme requires that a SHG
organise and accumulate its own savings for a
period of time (often one year), after which the
government matches the savings for distribution
among group members.3 DWCRA is implemented
by the Rural Development Department, and
managed by the District Rural Development Agency
(DRDA) (Mooij 2002: 36–7). Payments to the SHGs
come directly from the mandal, and are managed by
the mandal and village development officers. Mandal
development officers (MDOs) are ultimately
responsible for the implementation of rural
development programmes including DWCRA.
Within the local administration, MDOs receive
applications from prospective SHGs, which are
compiled by field level officials, and forwarded to
the DRDA for approval.
The programme most comparable with DWCRA in
MP, is SGSY. Like DWCRA, SGSY aims to improve
the incomes and assets of ‘below the poverty line’
families through self-employment and microcredit.
Introduced in 1999, SGSY merged six centrally
sponsored self-employment programmes, including
DWCRA and the Integrated Rural Development
Programme (IRDP). SGSY targets small and marginal
farmers, agricultural labourers and rural artisans
below the poverty line. Within this group, 50 per
cent is reserved for scheduled castes and tribes,
40 per cent for women and 3 per cent for the
physically handicapped (Nayak et al. 2002). In MP,
responsibility for the coordination of SHGs and
allocation of loans rests with the Block Coordination
Committee. Each Block committee covers 80–90
panchayats, spread over 300–400 villages. Unlike
DWCRA in AP, the formal guidelines for SGSY
stipulate the involvement of the gram sabha and the
gram panchayat, whose representatives and
constituents are empowered to oversee the
selection of beneficiaries and the performance of
the SHGs (Sjoblom et al. 2006).
Scholarly assessments of SHGs in AP and MP and in
other parts of India point to the challenge of
targeting below the poverty line families. Problems
commonly associated with the implementation of
SHG programmes in India include:
z Manipulation of beneficiary selection by
sarpanches and other powerful local patrons
(CARD 2002a,b)
z Manipulation of the investment decisions of
SHGs, often resulting in the purchase of goods
and services that benefit richer members of the
group (Sjoblom et al. 2006)
Johnson, Deshingkar, Farrington and Start Does Devolution Deliver in India?36
2Johnson38.1.qxd  11/01/2007  11:04  Page 36
z Cases in which single group members collude with
bank officials and abscond with group savings
(Eklavya team, pers. comm., 28 June 2002)
z Cases in which SHGs are established, but are
unable to secure additional funding, unable to
pool their savings for the requisite period or both
(Mooij 2002; Manor 2006, and see below).
Questions have been raised about the sustainability
and impact of DWCRA programmes in AP. Mooij
(2002: 37), for instance, cites figures which suggest
that only 25 per cent of DWCRA groups ‘meet
regularly, keep their accounts well, give loans to
members (and) have some kind of bank linkage’.4
Concerns have also been raised about the political
motivations and activities that underlie the
establishment of SHG programmes in AP (Mooij
2002; Manor 2006). Developed largely in response
to a campaign among rural women against the sale
of liquor, DWCRA provided an important means by
which the AP government could enhance its image
in local and international settings (Mooij 2002: 36;
Manor 2006: 24–8). During state elections in 1999,
for example, many SHGs were allegedly formed only
to obtain access to gas connections, provided
through the government’s highly populist deepam
scheme (Mooij 2002: 37). Drawing upon elite
interviews conducted with officials, academics and
NGOs in AP, Manor (2006) argues that large
transfers of finances to DWCRA SHGs between
1997 and 2004 overwhelmed the ability of many
groups and officials to spend the funds in ways that
would lead to productive and sustainable forms of
investment. In the rush to establish new SHGs, he
argues, the government was forced ‘to abandon
many older DWCRA groups’ (Manor 2006: 26),
eliciting very strong feelings of resentment and
frustration towards the government of AP.
The findings we present in this article provide ample
evidence to support Manor’s general assertion (2006)
that the rush to establish DWCRA SHGs in AP led to
the establishment of many non-functioning SHGs and
to the displacement of previously established SHGs.
Of the six villages we studied in AP, only one
reported having a functional DWCRA SHG.
Moreover, our household surveys and focus group
discussions in all of the villages suggest that DWCRA
SHGs had been established in the past. However, and
this may help to explain the ‘psychological and social’
(Manor 2006: 25) impact of DWCRA programmes,
especially before 2004, the perceived impact (and
therefore the political value) of SHG programmes
was particularly favourable in AP; among current and
prior beneficiaries of SHG programmes, self-help
financing was believed to have had a positive impact
on rural livelihoods and, in contrast to our findings in
MP, were perceived as being relatively free of
corruption. Our interpretation of these findings is
that differences in performance and perceptions of
performance reflect both the political importance
that state bureaucrats attach to self-help programmes
in AP and the size of the population being served by
the state bureaucracy. In particular, we argue that the
combination of development populism and more local
administration created a situation in which
beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries were much
more knowledgeable about the functioning and
impact of self-help financing in AP.
3 Decentralisation and debt: the impact of SHG
programmes and government credit
Our household surveys asked respondents to list the
main household expenditures they had incurred over
the past three years, and to identify the revenue
streams they had used to finance these expenditures.
According to our responses, 75 per cent of our
sample in the MP villages and 60 per cent in the AP
villages were in debt during the three-year period. In
MP, the average amount of debt, at Rs27,600 is
almost 140 per cent more than the average annual
income which, given the lack of regularised and
secured mortgage products, was very high indeed.
Levels and frequencies of debt were highest for
cultivating caste groups, reflecting the high seasonal
capital requirements of agriculture.
Across the sample of 680 households, 67 per cent of
expenditure was financed by moneylenders. Over the
three sample years, our respondents borrowed
Rs18,500 per household from moneylenders. The
remainder of non-routine expenditures was financed
by personal savings (Rs4,500), from family loans
(Rs1,500) and other sources (Rs700 each), including
credit societies, selling land, selling livestock, or
borrowing from a friend. Selling jewellery or a
house, and formal sources such as bank loans, or
kisan credit cards contributed less than 0.3 per cent
to household financing. The four poorest quintiles in
our surveys had no access to formal sources, and
were least likely to use their own savings to finance
non-routine expenditures (e.g. illness, dowry, etc.).
Moreover, the three poorest quintiles were highly
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dependent on moneylenders who financed over
80 per cent of their expenditure (90 per cent for
scheduled castes).
Perhaps the most important sources of government
subsidised credit in most villages were the
agricultural cooperative and credit societies (SSS)
which provide seasonal subsidised loans for farmers’
inputs. They also provide premium market rates to
buy output. These are one of the main mechanisms
by which government provides price support.
Interest rates for these inputs are low, typically 1.5
per cent over the six months in which the loan
should be repaid. Loan amounts can reach
Rs20,000 but are typically Rs2,000–4,000. These
loans, while paid out in fertiliser and clearly for
productive use, are highly fungible (usually through
resale via the village shops) given the high market
interest rate and strong demand for fertiliser in the
villages. Access to these resources is, in theory, open
to all, but access is limited. First, the minimum size
and late timing of payments exclude the smaller
farmers who need smaller amounts and need to be
paid for output sales immediately. Second, quota
systems are in operation for purchase and these are
politically controlled and distributed by the board of
the SSS. If a sales quota is refused, then no other
benefits are allowed, not even the subsidised
seasonal credit.
Compared with informal sources of credit, centrally
sponsored self-employment programmes (i.e.
DWCRA in AP and SGSY in MP) in both states
accounted for only a minor source of rural debt
financing. Only one village in each of the AP and MP
villages had a functioning SHG, and SHG financing
accounted for less than 2 per cent of financing
sources in the AP village. Likewise, SHG financing in
the MP village was small (3 per cent of all credit
sources identified by our respondents) in comparison
with moneylenders’ 67 per cent.
In short, the transfers provided by the major self-
help programmes in both of the states accounted for
only a minor amount of rural debt financing in our
study villages. Far more important were the informal
sources provided by moneylenders, family, friends and
own savings. Such findings highlight both the
limitations of targeted centrally sponsored transfers
and the extent to which low-income households
continue to rely on more informal – and usurious –
sources of credit.
In what ways, however, did past and present
beneficiaries of these programmes understand the
impact of these and other rural development
programmes?
4 Perceptions of government-sponsored
programmes
Alongside questions about participation in
government-sponsored programmes, our surveys
asked respondents to assess the ability of
government programmes to meet their household
needs. When asked to state which government
schemes had provided the most tangible benefits,
responses in AP were overwhelmingly in favour of
DWCRA. Women in all of our study sites reported
that they had participated in DWCRA, and that the
loans provided to the SHGs were fair (interest rates
were negotiated among group members, not
imposed), the funds enabled them to invest and
participate in new enterprises such as dowry
insurance, and that the government provided training
(in bookkeeping, saving, etc.) which they could use in
other walks of life. Even those whose groups had
disbanded reported the transfer of important skills
and the confidence to engage in collective activities
in the village. Moreover, despite the fact that
documentation is required for DWCRA membership
(DWCRA members are required to produce three
passport photos, as well as a ration card or income
certificate), we encountered no reports of the
bribery we found with other poverty programmes,
such as FFW and the EAS (Deshingkar et al. 2005).
Finally, and this is somewhat different from public
works programmes, many DWCRA groups in the AP
villages were multi-caste.
Such findings were very different from the responses
we encountered in MP. In all of our villages in MP,
we encountered no evidence that government
programmes had produced either the kind or scale
of benefits associated (among our respondents) with
DWCRA in AP. When asked whether government
programmes had helped women in the MP villages,
not only did our respondents reply that they were
not aware of programmes which had helped
women, but many actually stated that existing
government schemes in the village had done nothing
to improve the status of women. SGSY loans were
skewed towards the richer castes. According to our
interviews, applications for SGSY funding in MP
entailed a series of ‘charges’, which were imposed
for selection, paperwork completion (particularly if
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illiterate), delivery to the block development officer
(BDO) and payment of ‘processing charges’. Unlike
DWCRA programmes in AP expenditure of the loan
was highly restricted to a limited set of tenders who
were able to charge high prices and provide poor-
quality or inappropriate goods, such as ill-adapted
livestock, diesel instead of electric pumps, or high-
cost wholesalers for grocery supplies.
In short, DWCRA programmes in the AP villages
were believed to have had a positive impact on rural
livelihoods and, in contrast to our findings in MP, they
were perceived as being relatively free of corruption.
How do we account for these discrepancies?
First, and this has bearing on our understanding of
governance in AP, the sarpanch had little or no
authority to decide the selection of beneficiaries and
the determination of interest rates for DWCRA, as
she/he does in MP, and as she/he does with other
rural development programmes, such as FFW and
the EAS. In the former, the targeting and selection
of beneficiaries are under the authority of
mandal/block and village development officers.
Unlike FFW and the EAS, there is little formal, and
from our interviews, informal, scope to manipulate
DWCRA programmes without achieving the
connivance of mandal and district level officials. The
only evidence we found of DWCRA manipulation in
AP was a case from Medak, in which the sarpanch
and a number of local notables tried to convince a
SHG to use their loan to purchase tractors, which –
it appeared – would have enriched the individuals in
question. Significantly, the SHG in question had
sufficient autonomy – created in part by the
unelected bureaucracy – to withstand this pressure.
In MP, the gram panchayat and the sarpanch were
instrumental in deciding eligibility.
Second, and quite simply, DWCRA provides far less
opportunities for construction, road building, and
other forms of personal enrichment.
Third, intermediary (i.e. mandal) officials in AP were
routinely more involved in the allocation of DWCRA
programmes than were their counterparts in MP
(BDOs). All of the DWCRA beneficiaries we
interviewed in AP reported that they had joined the
SHG after a mandal level official (either the mandal
or village development officer) had encouraged them
to do so. These interviews also revealed that mandal
officials worked in close cooperation with the
DWCRA leaders in the village. When asked about
their performance – and to whom they were
accountable, field officers revealed a strong sense of
upward accountability. Mandal development officers
(MDOs) are ultimately responsible for the
implementation of rural development programmes,
including DWCRA. Within the local administration,
MDOs receive applications from prospective SHGs,
which are compiled by field level officials, and
forwarded to the DRDA for approval. According to
all of the MDOs we interviewed, final selections
were made on the basis of eligibility (BPL, women)
and availability of funds. These decisions were taken
at the district level. The District Collectors’ power
over the mandal rests in the ability to monitor,
transfer and suspend officials in the mandal office.
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Table 1 Gram sabha attendance, AP and MP
n (%)
Andhra Pradesh (AP)
Attend gram sabha Yes 230 (73)
No 87 (27)
Speak at gram sabha Yes 74 (27)
No 193 (73)
Madhya Pradesh (MP)
Attend gram sabha Yes 79 (48)
No 87 (52)
Speak at gram sabha Yes 54 (34)
No 105 (66)
Source Household surveys.
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Fourth, levels of participation in village meetings
(mostly ones concerning janmabhoomi) were
significantly higher in AP than they were in MP; our
survey responses revealed that rates of attendance
and participation in the gram sabha (a very crude
indicator of political inclusion) were substantially
higher (73 per cent) than those for MP (48 per cent),
a state in which the gram sabha has been vested
substantive powers and responsibilities stemming
from the ‘gram swaraj’ reforms of 1999 (Table 1).
Such findings are reflective of a more systematic
presence at village level on the part of mandal level
officials in AP. When asked whether they had met
the block- (or in AP mandal-) level officials within
the past 12 months, a total of 22 per cent of our
respondents in AP reported that they had either met
mandal officials on their own or in a group (Table 2).
In contrast, 98 per cent of respondents in MP
reported that they had had no dealings with the
block level officials in the past 12 months.
Such findings can be explained partly in terms of the
closer spatial proximity between mandals and
villagers in AP. However, we would argue that the
high levels of interaction also reflect the incentives
created by a state government and, within it, a
populist political party, whose political fortunes have
been determined at least in part by the ability to
pursue – if not achieve – a development agenda that
serves the interests of politically important (caste and
gender) groups in rural areas. During the so-called
‘janmabhoomi gram sabhas’, villagers could apply to be
included on the list of beneficiaries selected for the
programme. In MP, our findings suggest that access
to block level officials was far less frequent and less
common than it was in AP, creating a situation in
which sarpanches and other local notables were
often the only means by which ‘ordinary villagers’
could obtain access to the bureaucratic state and the
benefits provided through various schemes and
programmes.
Fifth, and related to this last point, gram sabhas in AP
followed a more rigid and systematic schedule than
did their counterparts in MP. Sarpanches, ward
members and villagers in Chittoor reported that the
gram sabha would convene on the fifth of every
month, and that gram panchayat councillors would
attend meetings at the mandal office every three
months. In Medak and Krishna, gram sabha meetings
appear to have been somewhat less frequent,
although representatives, officials and villagers all
reported that gram sabhas would operate according
to a fairly rigid schedule.
Sixth, and crucially, DWCRA is a programme that has
fostered a strong sense of entitlement (Mooij 2002).
Central to the performance of the DWCRA
programmes we encountered in the AP villages was
an informed understanding of what these
programmes were meant to provide and an
expectation of the conditions under which they were
meant to be delivered. Moreover, the fact that SHG
members are required to pool savings for one year
gave beneficiaries a strong sense of ‘ownership’,
which tends to mitigate against the kind of
corruption that plagues many ‘state-owned’
programmes in India.
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Table 2 Percentage of respondents meeting with block/mandal development officer
n (%)
Andhra Pradesh (AP)
Met mandal officials No 271 (78)
Alone 55 (16)
Group 21 (6)
Number 347
Madhya Pradesh (MP)
Met block level officials No 297 (98)
Alone 4 (1)
Group 4 (1)
Number 301
Source Household surveys.
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5 Conclusion
The findings presented in this article suggest that the
economic impact of government-sponsored self-help
programmes in AP and MP was minimal; of the six
villages we studied in AP, only one reported having a
functional SHG. Moreover, the levels of financing
provided by SHG programmes in both states were
extremely low in relation to informal credit sources,
especially ones provided by informal moneylenders.
That said, perceptions of SHG programmes in AP
were favourable. How do we account for these
findings, and what implications do they have for the
impact of decentralisation on social policy?
Lacking longitudinal data that would compare the
statements of our respondents with earlier
involvement in DWCRA programmes, it is difficult to
assess the validity of the assertions we encountered
about the performance of past programmes.
However, the responses were consistent across
major socioeconomic groupings within the villages,
and across the AP villages. Moreover, the perception
that DWCRA programmes in the past had delivered
tangible benefits to villagers who were no longer
members of DWCRA groups is highly consistent
with the historical account provided by Manor
(2006). In the absence of reliable baseline data, we
can therefore assume that the perceptions of our
respondents were valid, and consistent with other
comparative and historical accounts.
The findings presented in this article suggest that
effective government programmes were established
on the basis of interpersonal relations between
citizens and bureaucrats, and that these relations
were not necessarily dependent on the kinds of
direct and democratic participation often valued by
decentralisation scholars (e.g. Crook and Manor 1998;
Mathew 2001a,b; Manor 2001; 2002). In the case of
DWCRA, the devolution of responsibility to mandal
development officers provided an important source
of information and recourse to potential
beneficiaries. Moreover, the incentives put in place by
the state bureaucracy and by the ruling party appear
to have motivated field level bureaucrats in ways that
other rural development programmes did not (see
below). In MP, by contrast, the channels provided by
DWCRA in AP were largely non-existent, creating a
situation in which sarpanches and line department
officials were the only means by which poor people
could obtain information about and access to
important state-provided benefits.
What makes these findings particularly interesting is
that the same officials who were involved in, or at
least implicated in, the corruption of public works
programmes, such as FFW (Deshingkar et al. 2005),
were instrumental in ensuring the successful
functioning of DWCRA. Beyond the fact that
DWCRA programmes do not offer the type or scale
of rent offered by public works programmes (see
below), we would argue that the ‘relatively’ clean
functioning of DWCRA can be explained in terms of
the state government’s desire to transmit an image of
a government that was committed to principals of
efficiency, transparency and accountability. Whether it
actually achieved these aims is somewhat less
important in this context than the fact that the
government was creating strong incentives to ensure
that its flagship programme was reaching its
intended beneficiaries. Coupled with the widespread
understanding of how and when DWCRA was
meant to work, these incentives appear to have
produced tangible benefits for the rural poor.
What implications do these findings have for the
study of decentralisation and local governance
reform? First, we would argue that the comparison
of development policy outcomes in AP and MP
suggests that the size of population being served by
local administrative institutions and vertical incentives
within the state bureaucracy can have an important
bearing on the ability of local populations to
understand and act upon local development
initiatives. Our interpretation of the differences we
encountered in the two states is that differences in
performance and perceptions of performance reflect
both the political importance that state bureaucrats
attached to self-help programmes in AP and the size
of the population being served by the state
bureaucracy. In particular, we argue that the
combination of development populism and more
local administration created a situation in which
beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries were much
more knowledgeable about the functioning and
impact of self-help financing in AP.
Coming back to the wider issue of electoral politics
and macroeconomic reform, we would argue that
the evidence documented in this article suggests
that government efforts to compensate or
counterbalance the impact of macroeconomic
restructuring by supporting the formation of SHG
programmes in rural areas, were successful; the
women we interviewed in these villages had positive
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views about DWCRA, and these views were
associated with the government and with the party.
However, as Manor (2006) has pointed out, the
ability of the Telugu Desam Party to sustain the
electoral support of women was directly dependent
upon the ability of the government to provide
through DWCRA (and through other means)
benefits that would have a tangible impact on their
livelihoods and their lives. The evidence presented in
this article suggests that although the government
may have been able to deliver tangible benefits in
the past, its inability to sustain DWCRA groups in all
but one of our study villages suggests that the local
bureaucracy was overwhelmed by the kinds of
pressures described by Manor (2006).
A second observation which we draw from our
analysis is that the dissemination of information
about public services can strengthen entitlement.
Although the dissemination of information about
DWCRA in AP was inspired in large part by
political/electoral motivations (Mooij 2002; Johnson
et al. 2005; Manor 2006), the crucial point here is
that the content and function of the programme
was widely understood in rural areas, and that this
strengthened people’s capacity to demand and
expect a certain quality of service.
Finally, and perhaps less optimistically, the evidence
presented in this article highlights the notion that
DWCRA programmes in AP were less prone to
corruption simply because they offered fewer
opportunities for construction, road building and
other forms of enrichment. FFW, by contrast, offered
more resources and therefore more incentives to
corrupt the delivery of social policy programmes.
Whether this last factor justifies calls for smaller and
therefore less enticing programmes is an interesting
point to consider. Saxena and Farrington (2003), for
instance, have argued that pro-poor policies can more
effectively reach poor people if their benefits are
sufficiently small to deter the interest of local elites.
Indeed, ‘self-targeting’ (in which the quality of the
benefit is such that only poor people would want to
obtain access) is a widely used application of this idea
(cf. Deshingkar et al. 2005). The problem this entails of
course is that programmes with small benefits will
also produce small outcomes (Saxena and Farrington
2003). One of the arguments in favour of using
public resources to fund public infrastructure, for
instance, is that the investment provides important
multiplier effects in the form of subsidiary markets,
better transportation, better connectivity, etc.
(cf. Deshingkar et al. 2005). To ensure that projects of
larger size and complexity also benefit poor people
(e.g. through employment and other transfers of
public resources), extensive rights of access – and the
enforcement of these rights – will be vital. The
evidence documented in this article provides some
evidence to suggest the establishment of proprietary
rights can provide a means by which such outcomes
may be achieved.
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Notes
* This article draws on material generated by the
Livelihood Options study (www.odi.org.uk/RPEG/
lvdiv.html) led by the Overseas Development
Institute and funded by the Department for
International Development. The views expressed
in this article are those of the authors alone, who
would like to thank Mark Robinson for his
comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1 Although efforts to deregulate the Indian
economy started as early as the 1960s, substantial
macroeconomic reform initiatives did not begin
to take hold until a balance of payments crisis in
1991, which entailed a structural adjustment loan
from the International Monetary Fund (Jenkins
1999; Denoon 1998). Macroeconomic reform
efforts were subsequently directed towards the
privatisation of state-owned enterprises, the
deregulation of foreign trade and investment and,
to a far lesser degree, public sector retrenchment.
2 The study on which this article is based was
conducted before the incumbent parties in
Madhya Pradesh (Congress-I) and Andhra Pradesh
(Telugu Desam Party) were voted out of power, in
2003 and 2004, respectively. For an extended
treatment of the historical and political factors
that led to differences we find in the two states,
see Johnson et al. (2005).
3 As Mooij (2002: 36) points out, the so-called
‘thrift’ element of DWCRA was not introduced
until 1993, apparently in an attempt to ‘encourage
bonding’ among group members.
4 Here it should be stressed that 25 per cent represents
100,000 SHGs. More important, DWCRA is an
entitlement whose benefits, functioning and eligibility
are widely understood in rural AP (Mooij 2002).
2Johnson38.1.qxd  11/01/2007  11:04  Page 42
IDS Bulletin Volume 38  Number 1  January 2007 43
References
Ahluwalia, Montek (2002) ‘Economic Reforms in
India since 1991: Has Gradualism Worked?’ Journal
of Economic Perspectives 16.3: 67–88
Behar, Amitabh and Kumar, Yogesh (2002) Process of
Decentralisation in Madhya Pradesh: Panchayati Raj
to Gram Swaraj (1995–2000), background report
submitted to ODI Livelihood Options Project,
London: Overseas Development Institute
CARD (2002a) ‘Impact Assessment Study on Rural
Development Programmes in Bastar District,
Madhya Pradesh’, mimeo, Government of India:
Ministry of Rural Development
CARD (2002b) ‘Impact Assessment Study on Rural
Development Programmes in Balaghat District,
Madhya Pradesh’, mimeo, Government of India:
Ministry of Rural Development
Chandrasekhar, C.P. and Ghosh, J. (2004) ‘Bank
Reform and the Rural Sector’, Macroscan, January
Chhibber, P. and Eldersveld, S. (2000) ‘Local Elites
and Popular Support for Economic Reform in
China and India’, Comparative Political Studies 33.3:
350–73
Christian Aid (2005) The Damage Done: Aid, Death
and Dogma, London: Christian Aid
Crook, Richard C. and Manor, James (1998) Democracy
and Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Datt, G. and Ravallion, M. (2002) ‘Is India’s Economic
Growth Leaving the Poor Behind?’, Journal of
Economic Perspectives 16.3: 89–108
Denoon, David (1998) ‘Cycles in Indian Economic
Liberalization, 1966–1996’, Comparative Politics
31.1: 43–60
Deshingkar, Priya, Johnson, Craig and Farrington,
John (2005) ‘State Transfers to the Poor and
Back: The Case of the Food for Work Program in
India’, World Development 33.4: 575–91
Garman, Christopher, Haggard, Stephan and Willis,
Eliza (2001) ‘Fiscal Decentralization: A Political
Theory with Latin American Cases’, World Politics
January: 205–36
Ghatak, Maitreesh and Ghatak, Maitreya (2002)
‘Recent Reforms in the Panchayat System in West
Bengal: Towards Greater Participatory
Governance?’, Economic and Political Weekly
5 January: 45–58
Jenkins, Rob (1999) Democratic Politics and Economic
Reform in India, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press
Jha, Shikha (2000) ‘Fiscal Decentralisation in India:
Strengths, Limitations and Prospects for
Panchayati Raj Institutions’, background paper 2, in
World Bank ‘Overview of Rural Decentralisation
in India, Volume 3’, unpublished
Johnson, Craig, Deshingkar, Priya and Start, Daniel
(2005) ‘Grounding the State: Devolution and
Development in India’s Panchayats’, Journal of
Development Studies 41.5
Lieten, G.K. and Srivastava, R. (1999) Unequal Partners:
Power Relations, Devolution and Development in
Uttar Pradesh, Delhi: Sage
Manor, James (2006) Successful Governance Reforms
in Two Indian States: Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh,
IDS Discussion Paper 385, Brighton: IDS
Manor, James (2002) ‘Democratic Decentralisation
in Two Indian States: Past and Present’, Indian
Journal of Political Science 63.1: 51–72
Manor, James (2001) ‘Madhya Pradesh Experiments
with Direct Democracy’, Economic and Political
Weekly 3 March
Mathew, George (2001a) ‘Panchayat Elections:
Dismal Record’, Economic and Political Weekly
20 January: 183–4
Mathew, George (2001b) ‘Panchayats Powerless in
AP’, The Hindu 17 April
Mooij, Jos (2002) Welfare Policies and Politics: A Study
of Three Government Interventions in Andhra
Pradesh, India, ODI Working Paper 181, London:
Overseas Development Institute
Mukarji, Nirmal (1999) ‘The Third Stratum’, in
S.N. Jha and P.C. Mathur (eds) Decentralisation and
Local Politics: Readings in Indian Government and
Politics (2), London: Sage: 70–82
Nayak, Radhika, Saxena, N.C. and Farrington, John
(2002) Reaching the Poor: The Influence of Policy
and Administrative Processes on the Implementation
of Government Poverty Schemes in India, ODI
Working Paper 175, London: Overseas
Development Institute
Rao, M.G. and Singh, N. (2005) The Political Economy
of Federalism in India, New Delhi: Oxford
University Press
Reddy, G. Krishna (2002) ‘New Populism and
Liberalisation: Regime Shift Under Chandrababu
Naidu in AP', Economic and Political Weekly,
2 March: 871–3
Saxena, N.C. and Farrington, J. (2003) Trends and
Prospects for Poverty Reduction in Rural India:
Context and Options, Working Paper 198, London:
Overseas Development Institute
Sinha, A. (2005) The Regional Roots of Developmental
Politics in India: A Leviathan Divided, Bloomington:
Indiana University Press
2Johnson38.1.qxd  11/01/2007  11:04  Page 43
Sjoblom, Disa; Hans, Asha; Khatana, Virendar; and
Wadhwa, Subhash (2006) A Study to Improve
SGSY in Madhya Pradesh, report submitted to the
DFID Madhya Pradesh Rural Livelihoods Project
Technical Cooperation Project Support Unit
de Souza, Peter Ronald (2000) Multi-State Study of
Panchayati Raj Legislation and Administrative
Reform, background paper 1 in World Bank
‘Overview of Rural Decentralisation in India,
Volume 3’, unpublished
Vidyasagar and Chandra, K.S. (2004) Farmers’ Suicides
in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, Hyderabad:
National Institute of Rural Development
Watts, Ronald (2005) Intergovernmental Financial
Relationships in Eleven Countries, IIGR Working
Paper 5, Kingston: Queen’s University
World Bank (2000) ‘Overview of Rural
Decentralisation in India, Volume II: Approaches
to Rural Decentralisation in Seven States’,
Washington DC: World Bank, unpublished report
Johnson, Deshingkar, Farrington and Start Does Devolution Deliver in India?44
2Johnson38.1.qxd  11/01/2007  11:04  Page 44
